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 ﺧﻠق اﻟﮭوﯾﺔ اﻟﺧﻠﯾﺟﯾﺔ: اﻹﻗﺻﺎء واﻟﻣواطﻧﺔ ﻓﻲ دول ﻣﺟﻠس اﻟﺗﻌﺎون
  ﻣﻠّﺧص ﺗﻧﻔﯾذي ﻟﻠﺑﺣث
 
أﺑرزھﺎ اﻟﺑﺣرﯾن وﻗطر واﻹﻣﺎرات  ،ﺎن اﻟﻌدﯾد ﻣن دول ﻣﺟﻠس اﻟﺗﻌﺎونإﺟﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﻋدد ﺳﻛ ّﯾﺷّﻛل اﻷﺟﺎﻧب ﺟزًءا ﻛﺑﯾرا ًﻣن 
ﻣن إﺟﻣﺎﻟﻲ ﻋدد ﺳﻛﺎن ﺗﻠك اﻟدوﻟﺔ،  ٪٠٩واﻟﻛوﯾت. وﺗﺗﺻدّر دوﻟﺔ ﻗطر ﻓﻲ ﻧﺳﺑﺔ ﺗﻌداد اﻷﺟﺎﻧب ﺣﯾث ﺑﻠﻐت ھذه اﻟﻧﺳﺑﺔ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻘﺎرب 
 . ٪٥٨ﺗﻠﯾﮭﺎ اﻹﻣﺎرات ﺑﻧﺳﺑﺔ 
ﻠﯾﺞ ودورھﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺧﻠق اﻟﺷﺧﺻﯾﺔ اﻟﺧﻠﯾﺟﯾﺔ. وﻓﻲ ھذا اﻹطﺎر، ﯾﻧﺎﻗش وﯾﻌﺎﻟﺞ ھذا اﻟﺑﺣث ﻣوﺿوع اﻟﻣواطﻧﺔ ﻓﻲ دول اﻟﺧ
اﻟﺑﺣث ﻗﺿﯾﺔ ﻣﺟﻣوﻋﺗﯾن: "اﻟﺑدون" ﻓﻲ اﻟﻛوﯾت واﻟﺟﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﮭﻧدﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ إﻣﺎرة دﺑﻲ ﻓﻲ دوﻟﺔ اﻹﻣﺎرات اﻟﻌرﺑﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺗﺣدة. وﺗﻘﺎرن اﻟدراﺳﺔ 
      ﺧﺻﯾﺔ اﻟﺧﻠﯾﺟﯾﺔ ﺑﺷﻛٍل ﻋﺎم. ﺑﯾﻧﮭﻣﺎ ﻟﻠﺗوﺻل إﻟﻰ اﺳﺗﻧﺗﺎﺟﺎت ﺣول ﻣﻌﻧﻰ اﻟﺷ واﻟﺗﺷﺎﺑﮭﺎت واﻻﺧﺗﻼﻓﺎتﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻣﺟﻣوﻋﺗﯾن 
ﺔ ﺗﻌﯾش ﻓﺋﺔ ﺳﻛﺎﻧﯾ ﯾﻣﻛن ﺗﺻﻧﯾف اﻷﺟﺎﻧب ﻓﻲ دول ﻣﺟﻠس اﻟﺗﻌﺎون إﻟﻰ ﻗﺳﻣﯾن رﺋﯾﺳﯾﯾن، أﺣدھم ﻣﺎ ﯾﺳّﻣﻰ "اﻟﺑدون" وھم
ﻧﺳﺑﺔ ﻟﻛوﻧﮭم "ﺑدون ﺟﻧﺳﯾﺔ" ﺑﺎﻟرﻏم  وﻻ ﺗﺣﻣل اﻟﺟﻧﺳﯾﺔ اﻟﻛوﯾﺗﯾﺔ أو أي ﺟﻧﺳﯾﺔ أﺧرى. وﻗد ﻋُرف اﻟﺑدون ﺑﮭذا اﻻﺳم ﻓﻲ اﻟﻛوﯾت
 وﻗد ﯾﻛون اﻟﻛﺛﯾر ﻣﻧﮭم ﻣن ﻣواﻟﯾد اﻟﻛوﯾت وﻻ ﯾﻌرﻓون وطﻧﺎ ًآﺧر. ،ﺗﺻل إﻟﻰ ﻋﺷرات اﻟﺳﻧﯾن ﻓﻲ اﻟدوﻟﺔ ﻟﻣدٍد طوﯾﻠﺔ ﻗد ﻣن إﻗﺎﻣﺗﮭم
أﻣﺎ اﻟﻘﺳم اﻵﺧر ﻓﮭم اﻟﻌﻣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟواﻓدة اﻟﺗﻲ أﺗت إﻟﻰ دول اﻟﺧﻠﯾﺞ طﻠﺑﺎ ًﻟﻠرزق ﻣﻧذ ﺑداﯾﺔ اﻟطﻔرة اﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدﯾﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﺑدأت ﻓﻲ  
وﺳﺎھﻣوا ﺑﺷﻛٍل ﻛﺑﯾر ﻓﻲ اﻟﻧﮭﺿﺔ اﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻠك اﻟﺑﻼد. واﻟﺟدﯾر ﺑﺎﻟذﻛر أّن ھﺎﺗﺎن  ،ﺎﺿﻲﻣن اﻟﻘرن اﻟﻣ واﻟﺛﻣﺎﻧﯾﻧﺎتاﻟﺳﺑﻌﯾﻧﺎت 
ﺑﻌﺎدات وﺗﻘﺎﻟﯾد اﻟﺑﻠد وﻟﻛن ﻻ ﯾﺗﻣﺗّﻌون  اﻟﻣﺟﻣوﻋﺗﺎن ﻣﺧﺗﻠﻔﺗﺎن ﺗﻣﺎﻣﺎ ًﺣﯾث أن اﻟﺑدون ﯾﻌﺗﺑرون أﻧﻔﺳﮭم ﻣواطﻧﯾن اﻟدوﻟﺔ ﺣﯾث ﺗطﺑّﻌوا
ﺔ ﻓﺋﺔ "اﻟﮭﻧود" ﺗرى ھﺟرﺗﮭﺎ إﻟﻰ اﻟﺧﻠﯾﺞ ﻛﻣرﺣﻠﺔ ﻣؤﻗّﺗﺔ ﻓﻼ ﺗُطﺎﻟب ﺑﺎﻟﺟﻧﺳﯾ ﺑﺎﻟﺟﻧﺳﯾﺔ رﻏم ﻣطﺎﻟﺑﺗﮭم اﻟﻣﺳﺗﻣرة ﻟﻠﺣﺻول ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ، ﺑﯾﻧﻣﺎ
 وﺗﺣﺎﻓظ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﺎداﺗﮭﺎ وﺗﻘﺎﻟﯾدھﺎ وﻣﻣﺎرﺳﺎﺗﮭﺎ اﻟدﯾﻧﯾﺔ.
 هﻋﺷرات اﻟﺳﻧﯾن ﻓﻲ ھذ ﺎﻣن اﻟﺣﺻول ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺟﻧﺳﯾﺔ اﻟﺧﻠﯾﺟﯾﺔ رﻏم ﻗﺿﺎﺋﮭﻣ ﯾﺗﻧﺎول ھذا اﻟﺑﺣث ﺣرﻣﺎن ھﺎﺗﯾن اﻟﻔﺋﺗﯾن
ﺗﻠك اﻟﺑﻼد ﻛﺎﻟﻌﻼج اﻟﺻﺣﻲ واﻟﺗﻌﻠﯾم واﻟﺧدﻣﺎت اﻹﺳﻛﺎﻧﯾﺔ  وﻣواطﻧﻲاﻟدول وﻋدم ﺣﺻوﻟﮭم ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻔواﺋد واﻟﻣزاﯾﺎ اﻟﺗﻲ ﯾﺗﻣﺗّﻊ ﺑﮭﺎ أﺑﻧﺎء 
وﻏﯾرھﺎ. وﯾﺧﻠق ھذا اﻟﺣرﻣﺎن ﺧّطﺎ ًﻓﺎﺻﻼ ًﺑﯾن اﻟﻣواطﻧﯾن اﻟﺧﻠﯾﺟﯾﯾن ﻣن ﺟﺎﻧب وﻣﺎ ﯾﺳّﻣﻰ ﺑﺎﻷﺟﺎﻧب ﻣن ﺟﺎﻧٍب آﺧر، ﺣﯾث ﯾﺗﻧﺎول 
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وﯾﺧﺗﻠف ھذا اﻟوﺿﻊ ﻋن دول أﺧرى ﻣﺛل أﻣرﯾﻛﺎ  .ﺻﯾﻠﻲ ﻋدم اﻻﻧﻔﺗﺎح ﻣﺎ ﺑﯾن اﻟﺷطرﯾن وﻋدم اﻧدﻣﺎﺟﮭﻣﺎھذا اﻟﺑﺣث ﺑﺷﻛٍل ﺗﻔ
 وأﺳﺗراﻟﯾﺎ وأوروﺑﺎ ﺣﯾث ﯾﺣﺻل اﻟﻣﮭﺎﺟر ﻓﻲ ﺗﻠك اﻟﺑﻠدان ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺟﻧﺳﯾﺔ ﺑﻌد ﺳﻧواٍت ﻗﻠﯾﻠﺔ ﻣن ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ ھﺟرﺗﮫ إﻟﯾﮭﺎ.
ﻣل ﯾﺔ واﻷﺻل واﻟﻧﺳب ﻣن ﻧﺎﺣﯾﺔ وﻋﻠﻰ ﻋواوﻋﻠﯾﮫ، ﺗﺻﺑﺢ اﻟﺷﺧﺻﯾﺔ واﻟﮭوﯾﺔ اﻟﺧﻠﯾﺟﯾﺔ ﺗﻌﺗﻣد ﺑﺷﻛٍل أﺳﺎﺳﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻘَﺑَﻠ
ﺗﺑﻧّﻲ ھذه اﻟﺷﺧﺻﯾﺔ واﻻﻧدﻣﺎج  أﺧرى ﻣﺛل اﻟﻠﮭﺟﺔ اﻟﺧﻠﯾﺟﯾﺔ واﻟزّي اﻟﺧﻠﯾﺟﻲ واﻟﺑذخ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺣﯾﺎة ﻓﯾُﺻﺑﺢ ﻣن اﻟﺻﻌب ﻟﻔﺋﺔ اﻷﺟﺎﻧب
 .اﻟﺧﻠﯾﺟﯾﯾنﻣﻊ ﺳﺎﺋر 
ذا أﺳﻌﺎر اﻟﻧﻔط، ﻓﮭ وﻧظراً ﻟﻠﺗﻐﯾّرات اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻣﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺗﺳﺎرﻋﺔ، أﺑرزھﺎ اﻻﻧﻛﻣﺎش اﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدي ﻓﻲ ھذه اﻟدول ﺑﺳب اﻧﺧﻔﺎض
اﻟدوﻟﺔ. وﯾﺑﻘﻰ اﻟﺳؤال، ھل ﻣن اﻟﻣﻣﻛن اﺳﺗداﻣﺔ ھذه اﻟﻣﺑﺎدئ  ﯾﺷّﻛل ﺗﺣدٍّ ﻛﺑﯾر ﻟﻠﮭوﯾﺔ اﻟﺧﻠﯾﺟﯾﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﻛﺎﻧت ﻓﻲ اﻟﺳﺎﺑق ﻣﺣل رﻋﺎﯾﺔ
 وﻣﺎ ھو ﻣﺻﯾر اﻟﮭوﯾﺔ اﻟﺧﻠﯾﺟﯾﺔ؟
واﻟﻛﺗب اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗم  ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻛﺛﯾر ﻣن ھذه اﻟﺗﺳﺎؤﻻت وذﻟك ﺑﺎﻻﺳﺗﻌﺎﻧﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻌدﯾد ﻣن اﻟﻣراﺟﻊ اﻹﺟﺎﺑﺔوﻧﺣﺎول ﻓﻲ ھذا اﻟﺑﺣث 
  اﻟﻣﻘﺎﺑﻼت واﻟﻣدّوﻧﺎت اﻹﻟﻛﺗروﻧﯾﺔ. ﺣول ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ اﻟﻛوﯾت واﻹﻣﺎرات ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﻟﻰ إﺻدارھﺎ
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II. Introduction 
At the center of Sophie Robehmed’s satirical graphic novel Only in Dubai: An Essential 
Guide to the Emirate’s Expats is Karama Kumari.1 Named after Karama, a predominantly Indian 
residential area in Dubai, she is the exemplar of the Indian, middle-class, expatriate community in 
the Emirate. Karama Kumari drives a mid-sized Japanese sedan, lives in a densely populated 
residential community, and sends her kids to an Indian private school.  
 
Outside the satire of Robehmed’s novel, however, the reality for Karama Kumari, the 
community she represents, and perhaps all non-national populations in the country, is that they are 
forever bound to the “alien” label they currently hold. Regardless of how long they have been –  
and plan to remain –  in the United Arab Emirates, and regardless of whether their children were 
born and raised there, they will never become Emirati citizens. Their experience is, in fact, 
representative of many – perhaps all – non-national populations in the Arab states of the Persian 
Gulf. 
 
 For many of the Gulf countries, non-national populations constitute the majority of the 
population, with the discrepancy between the size of the national and non-national populations       
continuing to grow.2 It is in this context that the role played by these non-national populations 
becomes critically important. In my paper, I argue that exclusion of non-national populations from 
state-sponsored national identities, as manifest through citizenship rights, plays a pivotal role in 
fostering imagined national identities and communities among the local Gulf Arab citizens.  
                                                
1  Sophie Robehmed, Only in Dubai: An Essential Guide to the Emirate's Expats (Cincinnati, OH: Turning Point, 
2015). 
2 Kristian Ulrichsen, The Gulf States in the International Political Economy (London: Palgrave, 2016) p. 169. 
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My study will consider two cases of exclusion: the bidoon (stateless) in Kuwait and middle-
class Indian migrant workers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and especially Dubai. The bidoon 
of Kuwait comprise primarily two groups. First, the bidoon include the descendants of illegal 
migrants or quasi-nomadic peoples of primarily Arab descent whose ancestors either failed to 
register as citizens when Kuwait’s Nationality Law was promulgated in 1959 or were excluded 
from doing so; second, they include migrants from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries 
who abandoned their native citizenship to join the Kuwaiti armed forces between the 1960s and 
1970s but were never granted Kuwaiti citizenship. Though no official figures are available, the 
bidoon are estimated to represent approximately a tenth of Kuwait’s total population.3 
 
The middle-class Indians of Dubai are one important group among many in the city’s non-
national population. In fact, non-nationals make up 85 percent of Dubai’s population, with South 
Asians (primarily Indians, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis) making up 85 percent of that non-national 
population.4 Non-nationals work a diverse range of jobs, with a substantial proportion representing 
high-skill labor, many of whom hail from Europe and the Americas, but also a large population of 
low-skill, low-pay laborers, primarily from the Indian subcontinent and East Asia. Indians 
represent the largest non-national population in Dubai and the UAE, and are employed in a wide 
range of positions that range from professionally qualified personnel to blue-collar workers.5 
Importantly, many middle-class Indians in Dubai become long-term residents, sometimes for 
                                                
3 Anh Nga Longva, Walls Built on Sand (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), p. 49 
4 “Dubai Population 2017”, World Population Review, http://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/dubai-
population/  
5 Ali (Al)Nuaimi, ﺔﻣادﺗﺳﻣﻟا ﺔﯾﻣﻧﺗﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺔﻟﺎﻣﻌﻟا لﻘﻧﺗ رﺛأ [The Effects of Labor Migration on Sustainable Development] (Abu 
Dhabi: Markaz al-Imārāt lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Buḥūth al-Istirātījīyah, 2014) 
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multiple generations, and are therefore not necessarily transient. Yet, their non-national status 
persists and they have virtually no route to citizenship in the UAE.6 
 
 This study will consider how these populations are excluded from everyday life and 
society and how this exclusion is used to construct distinct identities and discourses with which 
citizenship-bearing natives identify. In both cases, for the bidoon of Kuwait and Indians in the 
UAE, exclusion culminates in restrictive nationality laws that make naturalization an impossible 
recourse for these non-national populations. Yet, as this study will show, the bidoon of Kuwait 
and Dubai’s middle-class Indian migrant workers have been dealing with their situation quite 
differently. Whereas middle-class Indian migrants in Dubai have, in some senses, embraced their 
exclusion and fostered a more sanguine transnational ‘dual identity’, the bidoon of Kuwait have 
continued to seek inclusion. 
 
In the pages that follow, I will draw on a variety of secondary sources to survey existing 
scholarship on the theoretical frameworks of citizenship, migration, and imagined communities. 
In addition, I will utilize existing literature on the cases of the bidoon in Kuwait and migrant 
workers in the UAE, which although substantial, has remained largely descriptive with little 
attention to the ways in which these populations experience and produce their environments 
socially, culturally, and politically.  Prominent authors on the case of the bidoon include Anh Nga 
Longva and Farah Al Nakeeb, while Neha Vora has become renowned for her study of the Indian 
population in Dubai in her book Impossible Citizens: Dubai’s Indian Diaspora. I will also rely on 
                                                
6 Neha Vora, Impossible Citizens: Dubai's Indian Diaspora (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013) p. 3 
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primary sources, in the form of interviews, activist blogs, and interview transcripts, to get a more 
nuanced account of experiences with exclusion. 
 
The study will be divided into five sections. The first will give a brief overview of the 
historical and theoretical contexts that underpin this topic, with a specific emphasis on the history 
and development of the Gulf states. I will also provide a survey of existing literature on the topic. 
 
The next two sections will look at the Kuwaiti and Emirati cases of exclusion more closely. 
This will require an exploration of the histories of these non-national populations, with an 
emphasis on situating how they were introduced to their respective countries, and an overview of 
the specific laws, policies, and practices that have created their exclusion. Although my study will 
treat the national, state-sponsored identity-building project as a continuous process, it will 
nonetheless draw on specific episodes that have highlighted this phenomenon; the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait in 1990, for example, was the pivotal episode for the bidoon in the country.7 Each case 
will conclude with a commentary on how the respective populations have contended with their 
exclusion, be it through awareness, rejection, activism, or some combination thereof.  
 
Next, in light of my findings from both case studies, I will attempt to reconcile what, in 
broad terms, constitutes the overarching khaleeji – Gulf – identity that this exclusion has sought 
to foster. As I will argue, the conception of a khaleeji identity on the part of local citizens is 
inextricably linked to many forms of nationalism, including performative ones. 
 
                                                
7 Abdulrasool Moosa, ﺔﻓﺮﺘﻤﻟا ﺔﺒﺨﻨﻟا ﻊﻤﺘﺠﻣ :ﺖﯾﻮﻜﻟا [Kuwait: Elites and Luxury] (Beirut: Dar Al Saqi Publishers, 2000) 
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Finally, the conclusion will briefly recap the arguments presented and the case study 
findings, and combine both to attempt to explain the motivations and reasoning behind the Kuwaiti 
and Emirati policies of exclusion. I will assess the factors that have allowed this policy to succeed 
and proliferate throughout the Gulf states, and, looking forward, will consider how sustainable 
these policies are, while highlighting potential factors that could undermine these state-sponsored 
discourses. 
 
Existing Literature 
 Following the dramatic acceleration in labor migration that came with the sharp increase 
in oil prices between 1974–1978, Indian migrants in the Gulf became a subject of academic 
inquiry. This created a considerable body of scholarship on the topic, which was initially largely 
descriptive, focusing on three broad themes. These were, first, national and international migration 
trends and remittance flows; second, the government policies and regulations in both the labor-
sending and receiving countries that were designed to organize this migration; and finally, 
community-level comparative studies of migrant behavior in labor-receiving countries, and the 
concomitant effects migration had on the social and household structures in labor-sending 
countries.8 
 
 More recently, these studies have adopted a labor-focused lens, studying the lives of 
migrants, almost exclusively, in economic terms. Many scholars have framed labor migration of 
low-wage workers from poorer nations in rational-actor models, such as push-pull factors, and 
                                                
8 Seccombe, Ian J. “International Labor Migration in the Middle East: A Review of Literature and Research, 1974-
84.” The International Migration Review, vol. 19, no. 2, 1985, p. 335 
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have contextualized it in a discussion of the Gulf Arab states’ rentier model.9  At the same time, 
on the other end of the social spectrum, scholars have framed the arrival of wealthy expatriates as 
motivated by an attractive business ecosystem, with an emphasis on the tax-free benefits and 
higher salaries the region offered. This created a polarized body of scholarship that paid little 
attention to the white-collar middle-class and how they produced and experienced their 
environment socially, culturally, and politically.  
 
 Literature on the case of the bidoon in Kuwait, however, remains even more limited still. 
In fact, academic research in the fields of sociology and political science in post-oil Kuwait 
considers – almost exclusively – the process of institution-building in the nascent state.10 The 
anthropologist Anh Nga Longva was one of the first scholars to critically examine the dynamics 
of citizenship, by undertaking a comparative study on a nationality-based hierarchical society.11 
The national identity debate, meanwhile, is a relatively contemporary one which was “sparked by 
acute socio-economic concerns about demographic imbalance and existential concerns among a 
number of Gulf leaders about the internal and regional influence of Iran”.12 
 
My study seeks to situate itself at the intersection of existing literature, furthering the 
comparative nationality-based hierarchical study put forth by Longva, while also building on the 
largely descriptive scholarship on migrant workers in Dubai. It is worth noting that although the 
term “migrant worker” in this literature has generally referred to low-skill, low-pay workers 
                                                
9 Sevil Sönmez, et al. “Human Rights and Health Disparities for Migrant Workers in the UAE”, Health and Human 
Rights, vol. 13, no. 2, 2011, pp. 17–35, accessed February 20, 2017, www.jstor.org/stable/healhumarigh.13.2.17. 
10 Hamsa AlJumaili, تﺎﻗﻮﻌﻤﻟاو تاﺰﻔﺤﻤﻟا ﻦﯿﺑ ﻲﺠﯿﻠﺨﻟا نوﺎﻌﺘﻟا ﺲﻠﺠﻣ لود ﻲﻓ ﻲﺳﺎﯿﺴﻟا حﻼﺻﻹا [Political Reform in the GCC: 
Catalysts and Obstacles] (Amman: Dar Al Jinan Publishers, 2011) p. 344 
11 Neil Patrick, “Nationalism in the Gulf States,” LSE Middle East Center (October 2009), p. 19 
12 Patrick, “Nationalism in the Gulf States”, p. 3 
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hailing from the Indian Subcontinent and Southeast Asia, my study will include and emphasize 
the role played by the prosperous middle-class, many of whom hail from those same regions. By 
drawing on the common experience of exclusion, I seek to bridge the two seemingly disparate case 
studies of the bidoon and middle-class Indian migrants, with a focus on the triadic interaction 
between the state, national populations, and these non-national populations.  
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III. Background & Context 
The Gulf Countries: Nascent States & a Narrative of Hyper Development 
The Gulf countries are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an economic and 
political union that comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates. All of them are relatively new states.  Having been under British control from as early 
as the eighteenth century, their modern forms only developed towards the later part of the twentieth 
century, and continues to evolve today.13  
 
British activity in the region, which at its beginnings was primarily a commercial pursuit, 
gradually evolved into strategic interests with the signing of the “Exclusive Agreement" in 1892. 
Although this agreement essentially tasked Britain with the responsibility of protecting the Trucial 
States, which were sheikhdoms along the western Persian Gulf coast and include present-day 
Bahrain and the UAE, it simultaneously prohibited Trucial rulers from yielding territorial 
sovereignty without British consent. Although the borders of many of these states were initially 
fluid, this agreement made owning and controlling territory vitally important.14 The discovery of 
oil in the region, first in Bahrain in 1932 and elsewhere shortly thereafter, further heightened the 
importance of territorial boundaries.15  
 
The discovery of oil had two important effects. Firstly, in most of the Gulf states, there was 
a rapid and substantial increase in immigration from the desert and neighboring countries. 
Although initial employment opportunities primarily served the rapidly growing oil and refining 
                                                
13 Khaldoun Al-Naqeeb, Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula (London: Routledge, 1990) p. 47 
14 Yusuf AlYusuf, قﺮط قﺮﺘﻔﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ ةﺪﺤﺘﻤﻟا ﺔﯿﺑﺮﻌﻟا تارﺎﻣﻹا [The United Arab Emirates at a Crossroads] (Beirut: Markaz 
Dirasat al-Waḥdah al-ʻArabīyah, 2013) 
15 Al-Naqeeb, Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula, p. 79 
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sectors, the spillover effects created numerous opportunities in secondary and tertiary sectors. 
Immigration initially occurred from neighboring Arab states, including Lebanon, Jordan, 
Palestine, Syria, and Egypt, where high-skill labor such as teachers and doctors were either lured 
by high salaries or expelled from their countries by events such as the nakba in Palestine. Soon, it 
expanded to include South Asian countries such as India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the 
Philippines, drawing both low and high-skilled labor.16 Secondly, the discovery intensified desires 
to break away from the British protectorate to prevent exploitation of local oil resources by British 
interests. Kuwait was the first to gain independence in 1961, with Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and the 
UAE following shortly thereafter in 1971.17 
 
Nonetheless, the borders of many of these countries remained contested well towards the 
end of the twentieth-century and even the early part of twenty-first century. The Kuwaiti border, 
for example, was formally demarcated and accepted in 1993 following an intervention by the 
United Nations. Similarly, the Bahrain-Qatar dispute over Hawar Islands only ended in 2001 and 
required mediation by the International Court of Justice. The Bahrain-Qatar dispute, despite being 
over largely uninhabited territories, highlighted the importance of demarcating maritime borders 
in order to determine control over offshore oil and gas deposits.18 More broadly, the recentness of 
these disputes demonstrates that “the concept of territorial boundaries for the states of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council is a relatively new phenomenon… [and] a principal difficulty in conceiving 
territorial boundaries, let alone defining them, was the alien nature of boundaries themselves, the 
lack of any need for them, and the absence of putative states in most of the Peninsula”.19 
                                                
16 Ulrichsen, The Gulf States in the International Political Economy, p. 174 
17 Al-Naqeeb, Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula, p. 63 
18 Mehran Kamrava, International Politics of the Persian Gulf (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011) p. 22 
19 Kamrava, International Politics of the Persian Gulf, p. 21 
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Many of these territories, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, and Dubai, are rooted in histories as 
mercantile city-states or quasi city-states ruled by local dynasties of tribal descent. With many 
modern state institutions introduced only after the discovery and exploitation of oil, the state – 
and, by extension, its citizens –  remained defined by their urban spaces. In Kuwait, for example, 
“it was the wall built in 1920 to protect urban residents from the attacks of the tribal militias of Ibn 
Saud which sensitized the landmark of modern identity politics. The wall defined a new line of 
physical separation between town dwellers and the populations that lived outside”.20 Elsewhere, 
in places like Bahrain and Dubai, “harbors were the only geographic barrier that separated towns 
from their surroundings, [and] coastal rulers (shaykhs) exercised loose control over people and 
goods entering their towns”.21 In this context of weakly defined notions of citizens and migrants, 
both groups became vulnerable to actions by the other and the by the overarching state. Studying 
this three-way interaction, between citizens, migrants, and ruling authorities of the state, is the 
crux of this study.   
 
Theoretical Underpinnings: Citizenship, Migration, and Imagined Identities 
The citizenship discourse has generally revolved around two predominant models: liberal 
and republican. The key principle of the first is civic self-rule and political membership, while the 
second builds itself as a legal status, and emphasizes protecting individual freedoms and rights. 
More recently,  the concept of an ethno-nationalist citizenship has entered the discourse, defining 
itself as  “a version of the nationalist doctrine … interested not in civil society, but in a different 
                                                
20 Nelida Fuccaro, "Pearl Towns and Early Oil Cities," The City in the Ottoman Empire: Migration and the Making 
of Urban Modernity, ed. Ulrike Freitag (New York: Routledge, 2011) p. 108 
21 Fuccaro, "Pearl Towns and Early Oil Cities," p. 110 
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kind of community: the nation or ethnic group”.22 Postmodern approaches, however, emphasize 
the increasing heterogenization of society and thus question universalist theories of citizenship, 
which define “citizenship primarily as a legal status through which an identical set of civil, political 
and social rights are accorded to all members of the polity”.23 It is thus the differentialist model of 
citizenship, which highlights the political relevance of cultural, gender, class, and racial 
differences, that underpins my study. 
 
Emerging from the differentialist model of citizenship, and lending itself to the new forms 
of transnational identities and belonging that modern migration has fostered, is the concept of a 
diasporic citizenship. Though this concept has been conceived in numerous ways, two definitions 
prove particularly relevant to my study. The first, proposed by Michel Laguerre, describes it as the 
situation of “an individual who lives outside the boundaries of the nation state to which he or she 
had formerly held primary allegiance and who experiences through transnational migration … the 
subjective reality of belonging to two or more nation-states”. This definition is appropriate for 
framing the case of Indian migrants in the UAE. Due to the contested transnationality of the bidoon 
in Kuwait, however, this definition proves less resilient in their case. Instead, I propose the 
definition put forth by Lok Siu, which defines diasporic citizenship as “the process by which 
diasporic subjects experience and practice cultural and social belonging amid shifting geopolitical 
circumstances and webs of transnational relations”. Here, the emphasis is on the modes of cultural 
and social belonging, and in my study, barriers to them.24 
 
                                                
22 Gershon Shafir, and Yoav Peled, Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) p. 6 
23 "Citizenship," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014, p. 4 
24 Caroline Brettell and James F. Hollifield, Migration Theory (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013) p. 168 
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Central to my argument is the notion of an imagined community and identity. First put 
forth by Benedict Anderson in the context of nationalism, he defines the nation as “an imagined 
political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign… it is imagined 
because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, 
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”.25 
Moreover, the community is imagined “because, regardless of the actual inequality and 
exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal 
comradeship.  Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible”.26 Perhaps most importantly, 
this community does not include everyone due to the difficulty it would create in sustaining a sense 
of unity; instead, comradeship and a sense of purpose is built on the community contrasting itself 
to an “other”.27 In my study, the “other” and exclusion become inextricably linked. 
 
Deproblematizing the Vocabulary: Definitions 
For the purposes of this study, I will define certain recurring concepts that may be 
considered contested and therefore interpreted in multiple ways. The definitions provided are 
merely intended to operationalize these terms in the context of my analysis, and do not necessarily 
lend themselves to official or theoretical underpinnings.   
 
The term statehood will refer to the independent, sovereign status all Gulf countries claim. 
For the purposes of this essay, the terms “state” and “nation” will be used interchangeably to refer 
to countries; in this case, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. While city-state will also be used, 
                                                
25 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (N.p.: Verso, 
1991) p. 6 
26 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.7 
27 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p.7 
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it will refer, in the case of Kuwait, to the capital city’s sovereignty as the country’s urban center. 
In the case of Dubai, it will, instead, refer to the city’s virtual sovereign status even as an emirate 
(state) that is part of a larger federation. 
 
In terms of geographies, the Gulf states, as mentioned earlier, will refer to the six collective 
states that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council, and may be used interchangeably with the 
acronym GCC. The United Arab Emirates will also be referred to by its acronym, the UAE. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, citizenship will be defined in its legal sense, as 
holding the passport of a country. Thus, national populations will be considered those that hold a 
passport of, for example, Kuwait or the UAE, while non-nationals do not, and this will crystalize 
their exclusion. In the case of the stateless of Kuwait, they will be defined as they are by the United 
Nations, “individuals not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law”.28 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
28 Brad Blitz, Statelessness and Citizenship: A Comparative Study on the Benefits of Nationality (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2012), p. 1 
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IV. The “Haves and Have Nots”: The Bidoon of Kuwait 
In 1957 – three years before its independence – Kuwait conducted its first census. 
The population was estimated at 206,000, with Kuwaitis accounting for 55% of that 
figure. This proportion decreased to 45% by 1961. In 1989, however, Kuwait’s 
Ministry of Public Planning publicly acknowledged that the bidoon had been 
counted as Kuwaiti citizens, thereby inflating the demographic data. The true 
proportion of Kuwaitis, the ministry held, was only 28% instead of 40%. 
Thereafter, the bidoon were excluded not only from the count of Kuwaiti citizens, 
but by 1995, they were excluded completely from population censuses.29 With no 
official government figures on the size of the bidoon population, the most recent 
estimates in 2016 have placed it at approximately 112,000.30  
 
The pivotal moment for the bidoon was 1959, when Kuwait introduced the current iteration 
of its Nationality Law. The law essentially defined three classes of citizens, the first being “original 
Kuwaitis”, Kuwaitis bil-asl. The law identified this class of Kuwaitis according to the historical 
urban spaces they occupied; specifically, they were those who settled within the confines of the 
wall that was built in 1920 to protect urban dwellers from attacks by the tribal militia of Ibn Saud, 
head of the Saud tribe and the first monarch of Saudi Arabia.31 The second class of citizens were 
those who were naturalized, and included Persian families and the huwala, Arabs who migrated to 
Persia in the eighteenth century for better economic opportunities but returned during the oil era 
of the 1940s and 1950s. It is worth noting that two important amendments introduced in 1960 and 
1981 made citizenship by naturalization increasingly less common; the first restricted the number 
of naturalizations of non-Gulf Arabs to fifty per year and the second required candidates to be 
Muslim.32  
 
                                                
29 Longva, Walls Built on Sand, p. 52 
30 Country Report on Human Rights Practices – Kuwait, Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2015, 
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2015/nea/252933.htm  
31 Fuccaro, "Pearl Towns and Early Oil Cities," p. 111 
32 Longva, Walls Built on Sand, p. 48 
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Importantly, the 1959 Nationality Law required citizens-to-be to register in order to obtain 
citizenship, but nomads, who “due to a combination of failure to understand the newly introduced 
concept of citizenship and an attempt to hold on as long as they could to their traditional pattern 
of cyclical migration”, did not register.33 Thus, they became the third class of citizens – the 
stateless. This hierarchy of citizenship was extrapolated to dictate the degrees of political 
participation each echelon would enjoy, effectively creating gradations of inclusion.  Today, while 
“original” Kuwaitis have full political rights, naturalized Kuwaitis are only allowed to vote after 
thirty years of residence in Kuwait, while the third class enjoys virtually no political rights 
whatsoever.34 
 
Initially, statelessness for the bidoon was not a problem. Not only could these nomads settle 
permanently in the country without the formal recognition of citizenship, but in Kuwait, where the 
importance of citizenship is in “the social privileges and material benefits it [implies]”, the bidoon 
still had access to free education and healthcare in exchange for taking up roles in the army and 
police force.35 Given the bidoon’s background as fighters in the desert, they were, in fact, more 
willing to take up these roles than their urban Kuwaiti counterparts.  
 
It is worth noting that there was a second category of bidoon who, although technically not 
initially stateless, performed a similar national purpose as the first category. When Kuwait decided 
to pursue its independence in 1961, it found itself having to assemble an army, but was faced with 
a native population that – despite mandatory conscription – was neither equipped nor interested in 
                                                
33 Longva, Walls Built on Sand, p. 50 
34 Longva, Walls Built on Sand, p. 49 
35 Longva, Walls Built on Sand, p. 47, 50 
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joining the army. It thus relied on mercenaries from neighboring Arab states, namely Iraq, Jordan, 
and Syria, to perform this duty. To avoid the national humiliation of admitting to recruiting foreign 
mercenaries, Kuwaiti authorities labeled them as bidoon.36 Following the end of the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait in 1991, however, many bidoon from this category fled the country to escape 
persecution after being accused of collaborating with the Iraqis. This brought down the population 
of the bidoon from 250,000 to around 100,000, with those remaining being predominantly from 
the first category.37  
 
It was only in the early 1980s that the combination of two separate phenomena made the 
issue of the bidoon a pressing one for both the Kuwaiti government and the stateless populations 
themselves. First, the oil crisis led to shrinking government revenues, tightening budgets, and the 
reduction of welfare benefits provided by the state. In 1986, the government abruptly and 
decisively ended all state-provided benefits that the bidoon had enjoyed for many years, including 
free healthcare and education.38 Secondly, the intensification of Iraqi aggression and the Iranian 
Islamic Revolution of 1979 heightened concerns among the Kuwaiti authorities and the local 
populace over internal security threats posed by the non-national population. Anh Nga Longva 
highlights how this perceived threat was rooted in the bidoon’s “ambiguous status as an 
unacknowledged population [which] provided a human pool into which Iraqi refugees, draft 
dodgers, and infiltrators as well as absconding workers and illegal aliens could easily blend after 
getting rid of their identity papers”.39 It is in this context that the bidoon became socially 
                                                
36 Longva, Walls Built on Sand, p. 51 
37 Sultan Barakat and John Skelton, “The Reconstruction of Postwar Kuwait: A Missed Opportunity?,” Kuwait 
Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, no. 37 (2014): 5. 
38 Longva, Walls Built on Sand, p. 51 
39 Longva, Walls Built on Sand, p. 51 
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stigmatized, and naturalization became a virtually impossible recourse for them as citizenship 
became increasingly restrictive and equally exclusive.  
 
Today, the exclusion of the bidoon from the national community manifests itself in many 
ways. For the purposes of this case study, I will focus on their physical, civil, and social exclusion. 
 
Physical Exclusion: Spatial Segregation 
The physical exclusion the bidoon experience determines the spaces they can occupy and 
where they can live. Because the bidoon are Arab like their Kuwaiti counterparts, often descended 
from similar tribal ancestry, visible physical separation becomes particularly important in 
excluding them from the national community: simply, they look like other Kuwaitis, with the result 
that authorities restrict them in spatial terms to keep the two groups apart. Today, most bidoon live 
in either Al Jahra (twenty miles northwest of Kuwait City) or Sulaibiya (fourteen miles west of 
Kuwait City). In the 1970s, the government built low-quality housing in these areas for bidoon 
employed in the army or police force. Though these houses are leased for minimum rent to the 
bidoon, the current ban on employing bidoon in both the public and private sector, which was 
instated in 1985, has forced them into the informal sector, and has made paying this rent well 
beyond their capabilities.40 Furthermore, no new affordable housing developments dedicated to the 
bidoon have been built. This, combined with the growth of their population, has created a severe 
housing undersupply, and has led to tin-roofed housing communities arising, thereby transforming 
these predominantly industrial areas into shanty towns housing bidoon populations. Importantly, 
these areas occupy the space “between Kuwait’s new urban and national boundary lines”: they are 
                                                
40 Blitz, Statelessness and Citizenship, p. 181 
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isolated outside the traditional urban-space that came to define Kuwaiti citizenship in the twentieth 
century – the walled town – and are instead closer to the traditional Bedouin desert hinterland.41  
 
Physical, socio-spatial boundaries separate Kuwaitis from the non-Kuwaiti bidoon 
population. Paramount is a system of multiple ring roads which have Kuwait City as its epicenter.  
This road system, which was built in 1952, creates definite boundaries thus mimicking the function 
the original wall surrounding Kuwait had. The First Ring-Road, surrounding Kuwait City, 
historically encircled members of the ruling family, with other original residents, ahl al-Sur, 
occupying the area restricted to them which is bounded by the First Ring Road to the north and the 
Fourth Ring Road to the south. Non-Kuwaitis today occupy the areas between the Fourth Ring 
Road and the Sixth (the outermost) Ring Road (Figure 1).42  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
41 Farah Al-Nakib, Kuwait Transformed: A History of Oil and Urban Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2016), p. 142 
42 Al-Nakib, Kuwait Transformed, p. 136 
 23 
Figure 1: Kuwait’s Ring-Road System (The six ring roads are bolded) 
 
 
Jahra and Sulaibiya lie outside the ring road system, and are known in popular and official 
discourse as al-manatiq al kharjiya, the “outlying areas”. The housing developments in these areas 
have essentially created distant, self-contained townships that ensure their “residents would not 
need to commute to commercial or service centers within the Kuwait City metropolitan area”, and 
it is through this physical exclusion that the bidoon’s first instance of exclusion from the Kuwaiti, 
state-sponsored national identity crystallizes.43  
 
                                                
43 Al-Nakib, Kuwait Transformed, p. 140 
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Civil Exclusion: A Passport to National Participation 
The Kuwaiti state effects the civil exclusion of the bidoon by denying forms of official 
documentation to this population, including civil identification cards; birth, death, and marriage 
certificates; and driving licenses. In Kuwait, the law states that only Kuwaiti citizens and legal 
residents may receive Civil ID cards. These cards are required to “rent or purchase real estate or 
cars, open bank accounts, enroll in private universities and some private schools; hold legal 
employment; and receive birth, marriage or death certificates”.44 In 1985, however, the bidoon’s 
official classification by the state changed from “undefined nationality” to “illegal residents”, al-
muqimin bi-sura ghayr qanuniyya, thereby deeming them ineligible to apply for these cards.45 The 
importance of this ineligibility lies not only in ensuring the bidoon’s exclusion from the 
aforementioned activities, but also in preventing symbolic claims to Kuwaiti identity. 
 
Recently, Kuwaiti documentation has acquired a performative role, offering metaphoric 
passports to participation in Kuwaiti mobility at home and on the world stage. For example, 
Kuwaitis boast that many Arabs regard the Kuwaiti passport as one of the most powerful Gulf 
passports in allowing visa-free travel to foreign countries, thus highlighting the mobility and 
empowerment it grants its holder.46 The bidoon’s lack of passports denies them this mobility. 
Though some may possess an Article 17 Passport, an application-based temporary travel document 
that does not confer nationality, it permits only certain types of travel, has additional visa 
requirements, and can only be renewed within Kuwait.47 Furthermore, the Article 17 Passport’s 
                                                
44 United Kingdom Home Office, Country Information and Guidance – Kuwait: Bidoons, 2006, Version 2.0, p. 24. 
45 UK Home Office, Kuwait: Bidoons, 2006, p. 28. 
46 “ﺎﺴﻣﺎﺧ يدﻮﻌﺴﻟاو ُﺎﯿﺑﺮﻋ ىﻮﻗﻷا ﻲﺘﯾﻮﻜﻟا زاﻮﺠﻟا” [“The Kuwaiti Passport Ranked the Strongest Arab Passport, Saudi 
Passport Comes in Fifth”], Raialyoum, July 1 2014, http://www.raialyoum.com/?p=114867 (Accessed March 3, 
2017).  
47 Report on Human Rights Practices – Kuwait, US Department of State, 2015 
 25 
dull gray color sharply contrasts the Kuwaiti passport’s distinctive blue color. The blue color has 
in fact become a symbol of Kuwaitiness and the country’s official color; members of the Kuwait 
National Football Team, for example, are affectionately called “The Blues” while locals 
commonly describe the country’s national carrier, Kuwait Airways, as al-ta’ir al azraq – the “Blue 
Bird”.48  
 
Social Exclusion: Demarcating and Isolating Public Spaces 
Finally, one can perhaps see most clearly the social exclusion the bidoon experience by 
looking at how they interact – or are prevented from interacting – with the citizen population in 
public spaces. I will use the example of state-owned education and healthcare institutions in 
Kuwait to draw out this point. Even before Kuwait’s independence, education and healthcare were 
traditionally state responsibilities. Twelve years after the discovery of oil in Kuwait and four years 
after the country’s first exports began, Abdulla Bin Salem ascended to power in January 1950 as 
the Emir of Kuwait. In his first year of rule, the Emir spent a fifth of the country’s total revenues 
on just healthcare and education.49 In fact, Kuwait’s first constitution, which was promulgated in 
1962 and reinstated in 1992, explicitly listed the provision of healthcare and education as state 
obligations. Article 13 under Part II of the constitution, “Fundamental Constituents of Kuwaiti 
Society”, states that “Education is a fundamental requisite for the progress of society, assured and 
promoted by the State”. Similarly, Article 15 under the same section reads that, “The State cares 
for public health and for means of prevention and treatment of diseases and epidemics”.50 Although 
these benefits ended for the bidoon in 1986, the exclusion did not end there. 
                                                
48 Anonymous Interview with a bidoon, interviewed by Khaled Abdulkarim, Philadelphia, PA, February 28th, 2017. 
49 Al-Nakib, Kuwait Transformed, p. 92 
50 Government of Kuwait, The Constitution of the State of Kuwait  
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Given the critical life-saving role hospitals play, they have a duty of care to patients, and 
therefore cannot deny service to anyone. Although the cost of unsubsidized health care deters 
bidoon from visiting health centers for non-critical conditions, it does not prevent contact in public 
hospitals between them and the national population for more pressing cases. Kuwaiti authorities, 
however, have introduced laws to ensure exclusion. In 2013, for example, the Ministry of Health 
introduced segregated hospital timings for nationals and non-nationals; since then, public 
hospital’s Outpatients Department (OPD), which provides non-urgent ambulatory care, will only 
treat Kuwaiti (citizen) patients in the morning hours (but they can also visit at any other time during 
the day).  By contrast, non-Kuwaitis, the bidoon included, can only visit in the evening.51 
Furthermore, Kuwait’s first new government hospital in over thirty years – poised to open in the 
second half of 2017 – will only be accepting Kuwaiti passport-holders for all types of care.52 
Although government authorities have stated that these measures aim to reduce hospital wait times, 
because non-Kuwaitis represent approximately 70% of the population while Kuwaitis are a mere 
30%, this measure will indubitably increase wait times for the country’s non-citizen majority.53  
 
With education, social exclusion is even easier to engineer. Public schools in Kuwait offer 
free elementary through secondary education for all Kuwaitis, and are therefore the preferred 
choice for the national population. However, birth certificates – which the bidoon do not hold – 
are a necessary requirement for enrollment, and therefore the bidoon are completely excluded from 
                                                
51 Courtney Trenwith, “First Kuwaiti Hospital Starts Morning Ban for Expats,” Arabian Business, June 30, 2013, 
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/kuwait/kuwait-hospital-bans-foreigners-in-the-morning-1.1684997 (accessed Mar 4, 
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this space.54 Instead, their only option is to attend private schools, which many bidoon cannot 
afford. They are thus forced to enroll in lower-quality schools, often community schools close to 
their dwellings and totally devoid of Kuwaiti students.55 Recently, makeshift schools dedicated to 
serving bidoon students, where classrooms are set up in independent societies and teachers are 
often also from the bidoon community, have arisen and offered free education to their population.56  
 
State-owned higher-education institutions make use of similar documentation requirements 
to exclude the bidoon from this space. Kuwait University – the country’s only public university 
and free for all Kuwaitis – has clear documentation requirements for admission. For the 2016-2017 
academic year, the university’s handbook defined Kuwaitis as passport-holders and the children 
of Kuwait mothers, even though the latter are not technically Kuwaiti nationals since Kuwaiti 
Nationality Law – like almost all Arab Nationality Laws – stipulates that nationality is transmitted 
by paternity. The second group must therefore present additional documents, including: the 
student’s birth certificate, the mother’s valid ID card, and the mother’s original Certificate of 
Nationality. The handbook also defines a separate category of students, “Illegal Residents Born to 
non-Kuwaiti Mothers”, and places an enrollment cap of one hundred students for this category. In 
addition to receiving security clearance from the Central Apparatus for Illegal Residents, these 
students must have achieved a minimum 90% in their high school diploma. No such requirement 
exists for Kuwaiti students, and this percentile is in fact higher than the requirement for all the 
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university’s merit-based scholarships, for which students in this category are not eligible.57 Bidoon 
rights activists and activist organizations continue to assert that  bidoon students tend to outperform 
many of their peers because admission requirements for the bidoon are considerably higher and 
there is immense pressure for them to excel, but no university or government data is publicly 
released to confirm this.58 Nonetheless, the combination of limited spaces and high minimum entry 
requirements make higher education a viable path for only a small number of bidoon, thus 
effectively excluding most of them from this space. 
 
The Struggle for Inclusion 
In February 2011, hundreds of bidoon, encouraged by the relative success of the Arab 
Spring revolts in other Arab countries, took to the streets in their hometowns of Jahra and Sulaibiya 
demanding citizenship and – more importantly – inclusion.59 Though Kuwaiti authorities quickly 
suppressed the protests, it had become clear that the creation of a “deprived community in the 
midst of a prosperous society [was] a recipe for resentment, social destabilization, and further 
insecurity”.60 
 
The bidoon’s tenacious pursuit of inclusion must be understood as response to their ethnic 
heritage as Arabs and the Kuwaiti, tribal-rooted national identity. The bidoon who remain today 
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see themselves as descendants of the same Arab tribal heritage that Kuwaiti citizens claim, and are 
paying the price of exclusion because of their forebears’ failure to understand the citizenship laws 
and their importance when they were introduced in 1959.  
 
In light of this, they view themselves as equally deserving of the social and welfare benefits 
granted by the Kuwaiti government to Kuwaiti citizens. They resent that the fact that they have 
been relegated to the lower-most echelon of Kuwaiti society, even below temporary expatriate 
workers, whom the bidoon believe do not harbor the sense of territorial and cultural belonging to 
Kuwait that they do, and who yet get to enjoy more of the state's benefits than the bidoon. The 
bidoon highlight the fact that their ancestors comprised the majority of the army and police force 
during the late-twentieth century, and even though Kuwaiti citizens accused the bidoon of being 
collectively responsible for an assassination attempt against the Emir in 1986, the bidoon 
emphasize that many of them were part of the Emir’s security detail, and several died protecting 
him.61 
 
Yet, it is their relative deprivation compared to the conditions of Kuwaiti nationals and 
expatriate workers that fuels the bidoon’s discontent. While expatriates can occupy the space 
between the fourth and sixth ring-roads, the state relegates the bidoon to the “outlying areas”, 
completely outside the ring-road system; while expatriates and migrant workers – even low skill, 
low-wage laborers – can pay a nominal health insurance premium and enjoy subsidized health care 
(compared to free healthcare for all Kuwaiti citizens), the bidoon must pay unsubsidized prices 
because they are considered “illegal residents”; and finally, while expatriates and most migrant 
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workers enjoy free movement in and out of Kuwait, Kuwaiti authorities use documentation as a 
bargaining chip with the bidoon.  That is, the Foreign Office of the UK has reported that Kuwaiti 
authorities will agree to issue birth, marriage and death certificates for bidoon on the condition 
they renounce claims to Kuwaiti citizenship.62  
 
Beginning in the 1970s, the Kuwaiti government promoted the concept of al-usra al-
wahida, “the united family”, to idealize and foster national cohesion.63 The bidoon, however, were 
not part of this conception; authorities portrayed them as outsiders and as a threat to social stability 
and internal security. It was through this sense of insecurity that the state created an image of an 
“us” versus a common, outside “them”, and crystalized a sense of national identity on the part of 
Kuwaitis who hold citizenship. In this way, the state ensured the systematic, calculated, and 
multifaceted exclusion of the bidoon. Nonetheless, despite the state’s best efforts to render this 
population invisible, the bidoon have resisted and asserted their presence. 
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V. The Middle-Class Indians of Dubai: Not too Far from Home 
Every morning at 6:05am, Emirates Airlines flight EK501, an Airbus A380 – the largest 
passenger aircraft in the world – lands at Dubai International Airport, completing its three-
hour journey from Mumbai. Flight 501 is one of seventeen daily flights between Dubai and 
Mumbai, catering to a fraction of the 2.4 million passengers in annual traffic.64 Although 
part of this figure are passengers connecting onwards through Dubai’s megahub, many end 
their journey in Dubai. They represent Dubai’s blue and white collar workers, but also the 
Indian elites who either reside, visit, or do business in the city. Although they have just 
completed an almost twelve-hundred-mile journey, many see it as having landed in “India 
West”; through tightly-knit nationality-based communities, a microcosm of Indian life is 
created. It is, however, the self and state-imposed exclusion that makes these communities, 
their schools, and hospitals distinctively “Indian”. 
 
Migrants in the Gulf & Dubai: An Overview 
The arrival of migrants in the Gulf Arab states closely followed the timeline of the 
development of the oil industry, with the discovery of oil having marked the initial trigger for 
short-term, remittance-based labor migration.65 It is worth noting, however, that the process of 
large-scale migration to the Arabian Gulf began well before the advent oil, during the pearling 
industry boom in the later part of the nineteenth century. Migrants, mainly from Iran, India, and 
East Africa, moved to Bahrain, Kuwait, and Dubai to participate in the economic boom these 
bustling port cities were experiencing. As the pace of migration accelerated, so did the rate of 
growth of the local populations; in the period between 1834 and 1905, the population of Dubai, 
for example, grew from 800 to 10,000.66  
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By emphasizing an economic narrative for both pre- and post-oil urbanization migration, 
the state portrays migrants’ role as “[existing] solely to furnish the managerial and service labor 
for the country’s day-to-day functioning, and thus they are not usually considered beyond their 
role in the economy”.67 Furthermore, because Emirati authorities regard migrants as entirely 
temporary, observers have tended to regard their long-term effects on the host countries as largely 
transient, too. As the growth of these economies continued, the influx of migrants persisted. 
Migrant identities – and the formative roles they played on social and cultural institutions in the 
host country – began to prove more resilient.  
 
In the context of Dubai’s relatively negligible oil industry, academic literature in the field 
generally ties the arrival of Indian migrants to the city’s history as one of the Gulf’s primary trading 
ports. Throughout the mid-twentieth century, Indian merchants and businessmen, seeking to 
benefit from what Neha Vora describes as Dubai’s “neoliberal economic ‘freedoms’”, played an 
instrumental role in building Dubai as a trade hub, especially for gold. Today, Indians represent 
the largest non-national population in Dubai. The most recent estimates have placed their total 
population in Dubai at 2.8 million, with 15-20% representing “professionally qualified personnel... 
followed by 20 percent white-collar nonprofessionals (clerical staff, shop assistants, salesmen, 
accountants, etc.) and the remaining 65% comprises blue-collar workers”.68  
 
As the demographic imbalance between the national and non-national population continues 
to widen, Emirati authorities have become particularly vigilant in protecting the exclusivity of 
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Emirati citizenship in light of what they consider an “internal demographic threat”.69 This, I 
contend, has required multi-faceted exclusion. The examples of physical, civil, and social 
exclusion will be discussed in this section, specifically in the case of Dubai’s middle-class Indian 
migrants.  
 
Physical Exclusion: Spatial Segregation 
One of the most prolific images shared on the internet and used to capture Dubai’s rapid 
development is a before-and-after comparison of Sheikh Zayed Road (Figure 2), Dubai’s main 
artery that connects the eastern, older part of the city and the western, newer part. Importantly, 
these two sides of Dubai have come to represent a much more significant divide.  And because 
Indians in Dubai represent one of the city’s first migrant populations, the first areas they occupied, 
in the eastern part of Dubai, have today become associated with them. I contend that historical 
self-imposed geographic segregation of Indian migrants in Dubai has crystallized their social 
isolation today, and this is propagated through informal government policies. 
 
Figure 2: Sheikh Zayed Road in 1991 and 2012 (Source: DubaiMemes.com) 
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The areas of Bur Dubai, Deira, and Karama in the western part of the emirate represent the 
closest residential areas to Khor Dubai, Dubai Creek, historically the preferred location for Indian 
businessmen involved in the gold trade.70 Today, middle-class Indians in Dubai have congregated 
towards these areas for two primary reasons. Firstly, a heated rent market – created by both 
increased demand due to an expanding job market and a relative market undersupply – has led to 
skyrocketing rents and has driven many middle-class Indians earning modest incomes to less 
desirable neighborhoods; this has generally meant a move to “old Dubai”, which the three 
aforementioned areas are part of, or areas closer to the outskirts of Dubai, which the 
aforementioned areas have recently become a part of as the central business district has moved 
further west, away from the old downtown near the airport (Figure 3).71 
 
Figure 3: Map of Dubai. The areas of Bur Dubai, Deira, and Karama lie in the eastern part of the 
city, near Khor Dubai. (Source: DubaiCityHotels.com) 
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Secondly, and in a related vein, the preference among Indians for these Indian-dominated 
areas relates closely to the image that middle-class Indians in Dubai have of themselves. Unlike 
Indian migration to the United States, where the main purpose is permanent settlement, many 
Indians in Dubai consider their migration to be both economically-motivated and entirely 
temporary. As a result, Indians have tended to develop a different – and, one could say, much 
milder – type of attachment or belonging to Dubai, while regarding the preservation of their native 
culture as of utmost importance. Many have achieved this through maintaining “a nondiverse 
social circle, sticking to those they felt formed part of their community usually based on religion, 
region, language, and class simultaneously”.72 Indian-dominated residential areas therefore 
become the most conducive environment for these purposes. 
 
Informal state policies have reinforced the practice and perception of geographic 
segregation. The strategic placement of community, social, and cultural centers, for example, 
demarcate middle-class Indians’ claims to certain part of the cities. The India Club in Dubai, which 
boasts its “top class facilities in the field of Sports, Social Amenities, Entertainment, Recreation 
and promotion of Business”, is located in Karama; in fact, the plot of land on which the club was 
built was a gift from Sheikh Rashid Bin Saeed Al Maktoum, the first Emir of Dubai.73 Similarly, 
Dubai’s only two Hindu temples, built in 1958 and 2012 respectively, are both located in Bur 
Dubai, and were built following directives by the presiding rulers and on land gifted by the 
government.74  
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Dubai authorities pursue informal policies of segregation in the other direction, by guiding 
local Emirati citizens to other spaces in Dubai. In 2014, the Dubai government gifted one-hundred 
plots of residential land, worth $554.5 million, to local citizens in Dubai. Most of these plots were 
in predominantly Emirati areas, such Jumeirah and Umm Suqeim, in West Dubai.75 Importantly, 
the conditions associated with these land gifts stipulate that the lands are intended solely for 
personal, residential use and could not be resold – not least to foreigners.76 In this way, authorities 
crystallize socio-geographic segregation along national lines.  
 
Civil Exclusion 
Civil exclusion will be discussed in terms of the ways documentation requirements reassert 
the “temporary” status of Indian middle-class migrants in Dubai, thus ensuring that any inclusion 
they may experience is merely transient. Unlike in the case of the bidoon, where an almost total 
denial of documentation is used to create this exclusion, stringent documentation requirements are 
used to achieve the same goal among all Indian migrant populations in Dubai, the middle class 
included. 
 
The kafala, sponsorship, system is perhaps the most effective tool for controlling migration 
in the Gulf countries. Through this system, any new migrant worker being employed is directly 
sponsored by a local citizen and is excluded from national labor laws. As a result, migrants fall 
under the purview of the Ministry of Interior rather than the Ministry of Labor; the police, rather 
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than employment contracts, therefore have authority to arbitrate disputes involving them.77 
Importantly, this system effectively creates a “rotating labor pool that could be rapidly imported 
during periods of economic growth and later expelled if or when times grew harder”.78 The low 
barriers to employment and dismissal emphasizes their temporariness, which is particularly 
important in disincentivizing cultural and social participation or assimilation on the part of middle-
class Indians. 
 
Even for non-worker populations residing in Dubai, including the children of workers and 
foreign students in higher education institutions, legal presence in the country relies on short-term, 
renewable visas. In the case of second-generation foreigners in the country, many of whom are 
born to Indian migrants, the state does not offer birthright citizenship and eliminates any 
attachment to their birthplace through constant visa requirements. In fact, once a male child reaches 
adulthood, he can only stay in the country if he obtains his own residency visa; this requires either 
permanent employment and employer sponsorship, or pursuing higher education on a student visa. 
Once students graduate, their only recourse is permanent employment.79 The uncertainty this 
policy creates propagates the sense of temporariness.  
 
The lack of citizenship also implies that middle-class Indians, but also all migrant 
populations, are effectively excluded from certain positions and workplaces informally reserved 
for nationals. Strong incentives for hiring nationals, combined with stringent limits on hiring 
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expatriates, create a dual labor market situation. In other cases, an explicit “Emiratisation” policy 
in certain industries specifies a minimum number of locals to be employed and distorts the merit-
based employment process. Importantly, this introduces the concept of hierarchical citizenship 
which creates gradations of inclusion, a phenomenon which will be discussed in greater detail in 
the next section. 
 
Social Exclusion: Demarcating and Isolating Public Spaces 
Social spaces can create and propagate exclusion by homogenizing the groups of people 
who occupy them. Social segregation between migrant and local populations confirms distinctions 
on the basis of national identity – a point that educational institutions and consumer spaces can 
vividly illustrate. 
 
Middle-class Indians construct and achieve a strong “Indian” identity not only through 
residential proximity; citizenship-based segregation in educational institution becomes critically 
important to their sense of distinction as well.  Firstly, the inability of children of foreign parents 
to enroll in public schools, which are reserved exclusively for Emirati students and are free for 
them, crystallize the initial local-foreigner divide. This represents a formal exclusionary policy by 
the government. At the same time, a desire for cultural preservation on the part of Indians, 
combined with economic limitations that make enrolling in more expensive, “Western” style 
schools impossible for many middle-class Indian migrants, drives most students in this segment to 
nationality-based schools that reaffirm the identity of their parents’ country of origin. Because 
“students in [these] private schools are not taught in Arabic, have little sustained interaction with 
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Emiratis, and learn Emirati culture and history only as outsiders to that culture and history”, their 
exclusion becomes tangible.80 
 
This exclusion extends beyond educational institutions, but also into what Neha Vora dubs 
“consumer citizenships”81. Discrepancies between the types of consumption exhibited by middle-
class Indian migrants and the local population demonstrate the mutual exclusivity of local-
foreigner discourses. This situation essentially leads Indians in Dubai to shop in predominantly 
Indian venues.  Whereas the locals’ spectacle of consumption is characterized by luxury foreign 
brands, the middle-class’ economic beliefs around wealth generation and preservation, combined 
with considerations surrounding limited disposable income, have driven them to exclude 
themselves from such performances. Importantly, the respective spectacles of consumption are 
intended to reinforce notions of rootedness and temporariness; whereas many Indian migrants will 
choose to rent apartments and use taxis, locals will flaunt villa and car ownership to emphasize 
rootedness. 
 
In public consumer spaces, such as malls and parks where people can theoretically 
congregate without having to pay and contact between foreigners and locals occurs, exclusion and 
de facto spatial segregation can occur by erecting monetary barriers. In short, prices can keep 
people apart – in this case, not only Indians from Emiratis but also Indians from the “expat bubble” 
of affluent foreigners.   In malls, for example, the spectacle is focused on spaces that require 
purchases, such as coffee shops; in certain public parks, especially those located in the 
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predominantly Emirati western part of the city such as Zabeel Park, entry fees are required.82 In 
such spaces, the increased cost, when compared to an unchanged benefit, excludes certain 
populations – including middle-class Indian migrants who tend to practice financial prudence with 
the goal of saving for the long term. 
 
Embracing Exclusion: A Dual Identity 
In fact, what Western media often calls Dubai’s “expat bubble” suggests an insularity and 
separation that local Dubaians themselves do not necessarily perceive negatively. Though some 
have argued the lack of inclusion is merely an artifact of the population imbalance between local 
citizens and foreigners, I contend that middle-class Indian migrants consciously embrace exclusion 
because of their own self-perception as migrants.  In other words, through their social behaviors 
middle-class Indians confirm their distinction from Emiratis, wealthy foreign residents, and low-
income migrant workers alike.  
 
For middle-class Indians, their embracement of exclusion is, firstly, the result of a self-
perceived temporariness of their life in Dubai; these migrants view their decision to migrate as a 
solely “economically driven choice that would not be made if enough well-paying jobs were 
available in home villages or neighboring cities”.83 As a result, preserving their native cultural 
values and identities – in preparation for an eventual return – becomes more important than cultural 
assimilation. In fact, the need for cultural assimilation is reduced by restricting oneself to 
nationality-based social groups. State tools such as short-term renewable visas create an 
uncertainty necessary for discouraging cultural assimilation, too. In this way, the state narrates 
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migrants’ “participation in Dubai’s market as a means rather than an end, thereby disavowing any 
belonging to the Emirati nation”, a narrative the migrants themselves willingly accept.84 
 
Secondly, critical to middle-class Indian migrants’ acceptance of their tenuousness and 
their denial of a right to belonging is a self-perceived “choice” to do so. In addition to the economic 
“choice” of coming to Dubai, which Neha Vora argues is rooted in middle-class attraction to the 
neoliberal market freedoms the city offers, migrants also have a choice – and the means – to return 
to their hometowns, and this reaffirms their temporary and transient status.85 Unlike low-paid 
migrants in Dubai, for example, middle-class Indians in the city presumably keep their passports 
– their employers do not confiscate them – and have the financial resources to fund their return 
home while supporting their families during frictional unemployment, thus confirming the notion 
that they could leave at any time.86 The disavowal of citizenship merely becomes a tool to ensure 
this “choice” does not become a right to claim belonging or to the state. Even in terms of being 
excluded – be it physically or from social and consumer spaces – this is, once again, portrayed as 
a choice; desires for cultural preservation and disposable income considerations aside, middle-
class Indians may choose to live elsewhere. Similarly, they may choose to partake in the type of 
consumption in which local citizens engage. Informal and formal state policies simply encourage 
certain behavior over others. By contrast, the bidoon’s pursuit of inclusion in Kuwait must be 
understood in their assertions of a lack of choice over their fates and current condition. 
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Through this desire to preserve the native identity, but also because of the voluntary 
acceptance of their multifaceted exclusion, Indian migrants in Dubai begin to exhibit a sense of 
dual-belonging; inclusion becomes defined through their occupation of shared urban space – the 
city – but it is an incomplete sense of belonging due to visible and practiced exclusion. The notion 
of an urban belonging is affirmed by Dubai Indian migrants’ tendency to nuance their identities; 
when abroad, they identify as being “from Dubai” rather than from the nation (UAE), and identify 
as firstly being Indian, but clarify where they grew up or work.87 In this way, they affirm their “in-
betweenness” and parochial status. 
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VI. Creating and Practicing the Khaleeji Identity: What it is, is what it is not 
Throughout this analysis, I have outlined experiences of exclusion for two specific 
populations: the bidoon of Kuwait and middle-class Indian migrant workers in Dubai. I contend 
that local, native identities – that is, the Kuwaiti and Emirati identities – crystalize around their 
exceptions and exclusions, and it is through the production of these divisions that the parameters 
of local identity among Kuwaiti and Emirati citizens is confirmed.  The same dichotomies confirm 
a broader, transnational Khaleeji – that is, Gulf citizen – identity found in the constituent states 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. These dichotomies, I propose, are 
how the imagined Khaleeji identity and community are created. 
 
In the context of severe demographic imbalances towards foreign populations in many of 
the Gulf states, clear and pervasive divisions combined with strictly policed boundaries of 
citizenship function to “[homogenize] the heterogeneity of ... [populations] by constructing a 
common ‘outside’ all [locals] could identify with”.88 This required “fabricating immediately 
recognizable identities to differentiate Gulf Arabs from the mass of foreign workers”.89 This 
created what Miriam Cooke calls a “Gulf Arab brand”, one that is regionally similar but also 
distinctive enough to broadcast national characteristics and differentiate the Gulf Arabs from their 
counterparts.90 I will use the analysis on exclusion to explore the physical and psychological 
aspects of this “brand”, and how this state-sponsored discourse of “khalijiness” helps form the 
imagined identity. 
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Physical and Performative 
The importance of the physical aspect of the Gulf Arab brand lies in it being the most 
visible determinant of identity, which, as Cooke argues, is critical for immediate identification. It 
will be discussed in terms of the ways citizenship is practiced to create a spectacle for outsider 
consumption and easy identification, especially in spaces where local citizens come in close 
contact with non-locals. This will be discussed in terms of dress, language, and consumption 
behavior. 
 
National dress in the Gulf Arab states, the thoub for men and abaya for women, is important 
in “[signaling] not only the nationality but also the privileged status of Gulf and Peninsula Arabs. 
It marks their difference from outsiders”.91 Local citizens find this especially important in countries 
such as the UAE – and specifically Dubai – where the local population represents the minority, 
but wants to assert its authenticity and dominant ethnic class.92 In the process of constructing social 
boundaries to their imagined communities, national dress becomes the passport to entry. It follows, 
then, that Emiratis find non-nationals wearing the local dress to try to “pass off as nationals, hoping 
that they would get preferential treatment” concerning as it represents a sort of infiltration.93 It is 
in this context that the difference between the bidoon and Indian migrants’ attitudes towards 
national dress must be understood; reinforcing their struggle for inclusion, the bidoon of Kuwait 
adorn the national dress like their Kuwaiti counterparts, while middle-class Indian migrants, given 
their desire for cultural preservation and acceptance of exclusion, do not. 
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Linguistically, Gulf Arabs speak khaleeji, Gulf, Arabic in their everyday interactions. 
Although the various dialects are mutually intelligible, each has distinct national features that can 
quickly identify the speaker’s nationality. While the bidoon of Kuwaiti may speak the modern, 
urban Kuwaiti dialect, their native dialect is the bedouin Jahra.94 Indian migrants in Dubai, on the 
other hand, speak little to no Arabic, and it is therefore the urban Emirati and Kuwaiti dialects that 
become the performed markers of khaleeji identity. This dialect is used in many khaleeji cultural 
and media productions, including soap operas that air during Ramadan and national day songs. 
Both represent important participatory practices of the khaleeji identity.95  
 
Finally, the modes of consumption that the state allows local citizens to achieve, and 
therefore exhibit, become a formative part of khaleeji identity. Welfare benefits, state handouts, 
and preferential hiring grants Emiratis and Kuwaitis greater disposable income, allowing them to 
engage in the consumption of luxury goods and services, most notably of products for which 
cheaper, equally effective alternatives exist. Amidst a global trend by airlines to eliminate first-
class cabins on aircraft, for example, the Gulf carriers remain committed to expanding and 
improving their offering. In fact, Emirates grows its first-class capacity by around six percent 
annually, encouraged by what it cites as strong local demand.96 Economic persecution of the 
bidoon and limited disposable income among middle-class Indians in Dubai make such 
consumption significantly more difficult, and thus the khaleeji identity emphasizes a sense of 
exclusivity in this sphere by simultaneously amplifying a sense of entitlement. 
 
                                                
94 Anonymous Interview with a bidoon, interviewed by Khaled Abdulkarim, Philadelphia, PA, February 28th, 2017. 
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96 “Emirates leads premium segment”, Emirates, July 31, 2014, https://www.emirates.com/media-centre/emirates-
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Psychological: A Khaleeji Nationalism 
In this imagined community, the nationalism exhibited by its members is ‘inward-facing’; 
in other words, it is a chauvinism towards non-nationals rooted in an ethnocracy and a sense of 
ethnic exclusiveness.97 This “civic ethnocracy” essentially results in “a societal downgrading of 
those nationals without pure descent”, and the exclusion of the bidoon and Indian migrants is 
largely rooted in such sentiments.98 In fact, the bidoon may opt to undergo DNA testing to affirm 
tribal lineage to “[determine] citizenship and concomitant entitlements to a share in the oil 
wealth”.99  
 
Such attempts at social engineering are extrapolated to the preservation of ethnic purity (as 
determined by tribal blood). In Kuwait and the UAE, for example, the state provides “financial 
incentives for a national male to marry another national as his first wife. Such intra-national 
marriage is further encouraged by the patriarchal feature of denying nationality to the children of 
a national woman who marries a non-national”.100 This remains the case for children born to 
Kuwaiti mothers but bidoon fathers, even though they suffer slightly less persecution than children 
born to two bidoon parents.101 
 
Citizenship as a non-binary outcome 
Although the practices of exclusion, performative citizenship, and a khaleeji psychology 
collectively play a pivotal role in demarcating and broadcasting the boundaries of formal 
                                                
97 Patrick, “Nationalism in the Gulf States”, p. 20 
98 Patrick, “Nationalism in the Gulf States”, p. 23 
99 Cooke, Tribal Modern, p. 29 
100 Patrick, “Nationalism in the Gulf States”, p. 23 
101 Anonymous Interview with a bidoon, interviewed by Khaled Abdulkarim, Philadelphia, PA, February 28th, 2017. 
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citizenship, it is worth noting that obtaining legal citizenship is a non-binary outcome. There are, 
what I call, gradations of inclusion; among “citizens, “locals”, are the most privileged group … 
[and] the government deploys multiple logics of citizenship that provide differential privileges and 
access to wealth accumulation for different groups”.102 In Kuwait, for example, first-class citizens 
are those whose ancestors were inside the first territorial boundary surrounding Kuwait City. They 
are the only class of citizens who enjoy full political rights, while second-class, naturalized 
Kuwaitis are only allowed to vote after thirty years of residence in Kuwait. It is also significantly 
easier to revoke citizenship from second-class citizens.103 
 
Similarly, in the UAE, possessing a Kholasat Qaid, a Family Book, that affirms ethnic 
ancestry (and, more importantly, blood purity) is used to determine the class of citizenship you 
belong to. Citizens who hold a Family Book receive preferential access to state welfare, including 
subsidized housing and handouts. Those who do not, including naturalized citizens and children 
born to Emirati mothers but foreign fathers, may be prohibited from enrolling in premier public 
universities, for example.104 Citizens who do not possess a Family Book also cannot vote or 
participate in national legislative elections.105 In this way, the government disenfranchises and 
excludes a segment of an already small population, effectively restarting a process of identity 
formation among a much smaller, ethnically proximate imagined community. This, I contend, 
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triggers a vicious cycle that reduces the state’s notion of a “pure” identity to tribal ancestry and 
racial privilege. 
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VII. Conclusion 
In February 2017, during Kuwait’s annual National Day celebrations, Ooredoo – a leading 
telecommunications company in Kuwait – released its song “What’s Your Story”, which it 
“dedicated to the beautiful Kuwaiti spirit and people”. The song highlighted Kuwaitis’ distinctive 
accent, kindness, prosperity, and fine taste – not least in food. The song was an instant success; in 
less than a week, it had gained over three million views on YouTube. Interestingly, the main 
protagonist of the video, Abla Fahita, is Egyptian. Furthermore, the song is performed by Balqees, 
a naturalized UAE citizen of Yemeni descent.106 
 
The Kuwaiti persona in the video is defined in the presence of, and against, an “other”. 
This mirrors a phenomenon that I contend is present in Kuwaiti, Emirati, and Gulf Arab societies 
more broadly. I consider the “other” to be excluded populations, and in this paper, I explore the 
two examples of the bidoon of Kuwait and middle-class Indian migrants in Dubai. These two 
seemingly disparate populations experience similar, a multi-faceted exclusion that has spatial, 
civil, and social dimensions. Together, formal and informal state policies, along with a range of 
self-imposed practices, create the exclusion in question.  
 
For the bidoon of Kuwait, exclusion is largely a state construct, and is propagated through 
both formal and informal policies. Kuwaiti authorities act upon pre-existing vulnerabilities in the 
bidoon population, such as their limited monetary abilities and a lack of documentation, to usher 
them to the periphery of Kuwaiti society and everyday life. Physically, the bidoon live in the 
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outskirts of the city, close to the desert and consistent with the bedouin-wanderer narrative the 
state tries to impose on them. Civically, the bidoon lack many or all forms of legal documentation, 
thus automatically deeming them ineligible for many opportunities, including free public 
education and employment. Finally, socially, policies inhibit them from interacting with the 
national citizen population in many public institutions, namely in hospitals and schools. 
Ultimately, the bidoon, despite representing around a tenth of the Kuwaiti population, “do not 
exist. They have been dehumanized and rendered invisible by government policies coupled with 
pervasive social stigmatization”.107 
 
For middle-class Indian migrants in Dubai, exclusion takes internal and external forms, 
and manifests itself in everyday divisions. Physically, this class of Indian migrants inhabit certain 
areas that were historically associated with them during the city’s early days. Civically, excessive 
and stringent documentation requirements create uncertainty and reinforce their temporariness as 
both a state of being and state of mind. Finally, socially, informal and formal barriers exclude this 
population from certain types of performative citizenship, namely consumption and dress. In this 
way, Indians in the city “narrate and perform a belonging to Dubai within a state of permanent 
temporariness”, and exclusion becomes a formative, and accepted, part of their identity.108 
 
By creating these exceptions and exclusions to society and life, the Kuwaiti, Emirati, and 
more broadly Gulf or “khaleeji” identities crystallize. They create divisions that demarcate how 
these identities are created, practiced, and reinforced. This makes social engineering a viable goal 
for the Kuwaiti and Emirati states, and provides the necessary social capital for the creation of an 
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imagined identity, and an identity-based community, among the local citizen population. 
Khaleejis, Kuwaitis, and Emiratis thereby turn inward rather than outward in expressing their 
nationalism. Their nationalism, in other words, is an introspective affair. 
 
In the context of a growing disproportion between the sizes of local and non-local 
populations, wherein citizens have come to perceive the latter as a “cultural threat”, attempts at 
national homogenization through the propagation of a singular identity have essentially equated 
ethnic membership with state loyalty. Despite their relative newness on the world stage, Gulf states 
and state institutions have been at the forefront of this identity-building process, with the example 
of formal citizenship representing the key legal instrument exercised to effect it. The rise of the 
state as the supreme arbiter of national identity has remained successful and sustainable during 
times of abundant budget surpluses, wherein identity has remained inextricably linked to access to 
welfare benefits by “[asserting a] unique right to citizenship and exclusive entitlement to national 
wealth”.109  
 
At a time when tightening national budgets from falling oil revenues pose numerous 
challenges to governments and citizens alike, the ability of Gulf governments to continue 
arbitrating and promoting a singular and inflexible idea of identity comes into question. Although 
the privileged status this identity bestows upon its holders gives it some rigidity, the loss of many 
“privileging” welfare benefits – the uncertainty, for example, of the state’s future ability to 
guarantee free health care and schooling to citizens – undermines this identity’s power. This 
situation may create space for new types of identities – whether religious, race-based, class-based, 
                                                
109 Cooke, Tribal Modern, p. 12 
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or otherwise – to assert themselves. It is when these alternative identities come into conflict with 
the incumbent state-sponsored identities that a credible threat to the state’s “stability and viability 
in the face of major economic, political, and social upheaval” arises. Furthermore, as the tension 
between a desire for homogenization in the context of an increasingly heterogeneous cosmopolitan 
society grows, many Gulf states may be forced to revisit the category of “citizen” as the 
determinant of “social status, belonging, and access to rights”.110As Benedict Anderson asserts, 
passports are becoming “less and less attestations of citizenship, let alone of loyalty to a protective 
state, than of claims to participate in a labour market”. In a city like Dubai, which has been resolute 
in its desire to become the world’s leading knowledge and skill-based economy, attracting and 
retaining entrepreneurs, scientists, academics may require offering them a greater sense of 
permanence and integration through naturalization.  
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